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1. Introduction
Most papers in applied monetary economics are concerned with aggregate macroeconomic 
data, and ignore the possible consequences of monetary policy interventions for income 
distribution and poverty. This is true not only of papers about OECD countries, but also of 
papers about developing economies. There are some exceptions. Romer and Romer (1998) 
and Easterly and Fischer (2000) look at the cross-country correlation between aggregate 
inflation and the well being of the poor, finding that on average low inflation enhances 
welfare. Similar conclusions arise from the case studies in Ganuza and Taylor (1998). 
Another group of papers, including Cardoso (1992), Cobham (2001) and Azam (2003), look 
at the impact of different types of macroeconomic policy reform – such as orthodox 
stabilization packages, capital account liberalization and nominal exchange rate devaluation – 
on poverty. 
  A common theme in many of these papers is an emphasis on extreme contrasts (such as 
the difference between countries with hyperinflation and those with moderate inflation) or on 
the extreme policy interventions associated with macroeconomic policy reform that were so 
common in developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s. They have less to say about the 
impact of “day to day” monetary policy on poverty. In countries that now have a relatively 
low and stable rate of inflation, and a manageable budget deficit, how do alternative types of 
monetary policy intervention affect the poor? Often, when looking at large, secular changes in 
the inflation rate, the focus of attention is on the adjustment of wages and on unemployment. 
But alternative short-term stabilization policy rules that impact on the prices of different 
commodities in different ways could also have very different consequences for the welfare of 
the poor. Even at very short horizons, over which wages are fixed, variations in prices could 
have a substantial impact on welfare. For example, some types of policy could be associated 
with relatively high variation in the prices of commodities (such as food) that make up a large 
fraction of the consumption of poorer households. 
  Why might this be so? Consider the possible differences between the impact of a 
change in interest rates and a change in the volume currency issued (still a potentially 
effective monetary policy tool in countries where financial markets are underdeveloped and 
M0 makes up a large fraction of the total money stock). M0 is a poor person’s financial asset. 
An expansion of the currency stock will generate excess liquidity predominantly among the 
poor, and relatively more inflation in the prices of commodities consumed mostly by the poor. 
By contrast, the interest elasticity of saving is not likely to be much higher among the poor 2
than it is among the rich. (In some developing countries it has been very low among all 
income groups.) So a reduction in the interest rate is less likely to generate more inflation 
among the commodities consumed mostly by the poor. Even if the prices of different 
commodities are cointegrated in the long run, inertia in the price convergence process might 
mean that short-run asymmetries of this kind are substantial. 
  The picture becomes even more complex if increases in liquidity stimulate a positive 
agricultural supply response in the short run, and cause an initial reduction in food prices. 
This is possible if, for example, aggregate prices are slow to rise in response to an increase in 
the nominal money stock, so there is an increase in the level of private sector real wealth. If 
people want to maintain a fixed wealth-income ratio, this may stimulate a reduction in the 
holding of other assets, including storable agricultural commodities. 
  It is quite possible that alternative types of monetary policy intervention that have the 
same aggregate effect – on for example the aggregate consumer price index – have very 
different types of effect on the components of this index, and therefore on the volatility of 
prices faced by different income groups. By a similar argument, there could be substantial 
regional asymmetries in the effects of different types of policy. In this paper we will explore 
these issues with respect to one particular area, the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (UEMOA). 
  The UEMOA is a suitable area in which to address these questions because it has a 
history of a low and stable rate of inflation. The currency of the monetary union, the CFA 
Franc  issued by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO),
1 has long been pegged to 
the French Franc (and now the Euro) at a fixed rate, with only a single devaluation since 
1948. This devaluation (of 100%) occurred in January 1994, and one Euro is now worth 657 
CFA Francs. Aside from the first few months of 1994, inflation in the member states of the 
UEMOA has been comparable with that of France.
2,3 Commitment to the fixed peg by a 
transnational central bank makes a low long-run rate of monetary expansion a time-consistent 
policy. The questions about poverty surrounding the comparison of low and high-inflation 
regimes are not relevant here. But the formulation of welfare-enhancing short-term monetary 
policy ought to be informed by the impact of such policy on the poor. Moreover, the relatively 
high-quality monetary data provided by the BCEAO makes such a study feasible. 
1 This is not to be confused with the CFA Franc issued by the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), an 
entirely different currency in a monetary area outside the scope of this paper. 
2 Azam (2003) deals with the consequences of the devaluation episode for poverty in the UEMOA. 
3 Although there is no evidence for PPP in levels between France and the UEMOA (Nuven, 1994).  3
  In addition, the existence of regional price data within the UEMOA makes it possible to 
determine whether there are any regional asymmetries in the impact of monetary policy. The 
area has a single central bank issuing a single currency; but regional differences in, for 
example, the magnitude of short-run price inertia might mean that a monetary policy 
intervention has very different effects in different regions. 
  These issues will be addressed by fitting a time-series model of regional food and non-
food prices to data from the UEMOA. The structure of this model is elaborated in the 
following section. 
2. Conceptual Overview
The aim of the paper is to trace out the impact of monetary policy interventions on the price 
of the food and non-food components of the retail price index for urban consumers in 
different locations in the UEMOA. In this way, we can examine the effect of policy changes 
on the cost of living of different hypothetical income groups, among whom food consumption 
makes up a different proportion of total expenditure. 
  BCEAO monthly price statistics (discussed in more detail in the next section) are 
available for the principal cities of seven out of the eight countries that make up the UEMOA: 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.
4 (Data for Guinea-
Bissau, which joined the monetary union in 1997, are not available.) Our econometric model 
will make use of these data. We will be focussing on the post-devaluation period (1994-2002). 
The 100% devaluation of the CFA Franc in January 1994 represented a substantial structural 
break in the DGP for prices across the UEMOA, and it turned out not to be possible to fit a 
model with stable parameters to a data set incorporating the break period. 
  In this section, we provide an overview of the modeling framework to be employed. 
This framework is based on several key assumptions. 
  The first underlying assumption of the model (which will later be tested) is that there is 
long-run cointegration between the logarithms of food and non-food prices (p
f and p
r) in each 
country i, each of which is integrated I(1). Moreover, there is long-run cointegration between 
the price of food in country i and the price of food in any of the other countries; the same is 
true of the non-food aggregate. However, prices differ from each other in the short run 
because they are subjected to shocks (
z
it H , z = (f, r)) that are not perfectly correlated. These 
4 That is, Cotonou, Ougadougou, Abidjan, Bamako, Niamey, Dakar and Lomé. 4
shocks include local variations in productivity and in the cost of imports (the share of 
different commodities in total imports varying from one country to another).  
  The process of equilibrium correction could take a number of forms. In the UMEOA, 
one country (Côte d’Ivoire) is very much larger than the rest, and there is a substantial amount 
of migration between many of the smaller countries and Ivorian cities.
5 We will assume that 
Côte d’Ivoire is a “lead” country, in the sense that prices in other countries all eventually 
converge on those in Côte d’Ivoire, but Ivorian prices are not affected by prices in the smaller 
countries, at least in the long run. (This assumption will be tested later.) In the absence of any 
changes in income, the money supply or interest rates, prices in each of the smaller countries 
(i) evolve according to an equilibrium correction process of the form: 
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where the  ) (L i E  and  ) (L i T  terms are lag operators and the  it P  terms represent a set of 
deterministic components in the process. The time domain t is measured in months. We 
expect the signs and sizes of the J parameters to be consistent with the long-run stability of 
the system with full price convergence, but do not impose any structure on the short-run 
dynamics captured by the  ) (L i E  and  ) (L i T  terms. In the short run, prices in country i could 
be especially sensitive to prices in one or more of the other countries. Equations (1-2) can also 
be re-parameterized as:  
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5 See Appleyard (1999) for a description of migration patterns in the area. 5
where the first equilibrium correction term includes only Ivorian prices. Note that in the 
“lead” country, Côte d’Ivoire, only the first equilibrium correction term enters into the price 
equations. The last two equilibrium correction terms are equal to zero by construction. 
  How do changes in monetary policy affect prices? In this paper we consider the possible 
influence of two policy instruments, the stock of currency in circulation in the UEMOA (m)
and the BCEAO base interest rate (r). The impact of changes in m on prices will depend on its 
interaction with other monetary aggregates. There is some evidence that there is a stable real 
M1 demand function (i.e., demand for m plus checking deposits) across the monetary area, if 
we allow for an exogenous structural break in the devaluation year, 1994.
6 Moreover, there 
are few legal restrictions on checking deposits. So, if checking deposits are a close substitute 
for currency, any increase in m will (at least partially) be offset by a reduction in deposits, 
ceteris paribus. In this case, there will be no stable long-run relationship between the real 
value of currency and the determinants of demand for M1 (real income and interest rates). 
  This appears to be the case. If we use annual data for the pre-devaluation period (1964-
93), it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that there is no long-run relationship between the 
real value of currency, income and the interest rate. We conducted a test for the existence of 
such a relationship using real GDP as an income measure for the seven UEMOA countries 
(excluding Guinea-Bissau), and constructing an aggregate UEMOA price series as the GDP-
weighted average of national GDP deflators. (Consumer price indices are not available for all 
countries before 1970.)  The test follows the method of Pesaran et al. (2001), which does not 
require a priori knowledge about the order of integration of the series. It is constructed as an 
F-statistic for the joint significance of the T parameters in the regression: 
t t t t
t t t
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where pt is the aggregate deflator, yt is aggregate real income, rt is the (base) interest rate and 
ut a residual. There is a range of critical values for the F-statistic, depending on the (unknown) 
order of integration of the different series. Using a lag order of one (which optimizes the 
Hannan-Quinn and Akaike criteria for the regression), our computed F-statistic is 2.90, which 
falls below the lower bound of these critical values. In other words, regardless of the order of 
integration of the series, we cannot reject the null that there is no long-run relationship.
7 If the 
                                                
6 See for example Sugimoto (2001). 
7 This is still true if we exclude the interest rate from the regression. 6
sample is extended beyond 1993, there is still no evidence for a long-run relationship, and the 
regression parameters become unstable. 
  For this reason, we model the impact of monetary policy on prices in the post-
devaluation period without cointegration between (m – p) and the determinants of demand for 
real M1. We allow for the possibility that changes in m or r have an immediate direct impact 
on prices, before the volume of checking deposits has time to adjust. But in the long run there 
is no stable relationship between the price level and the level of currency. This model 
encompasses as a special case the situation in which deposits adjust instantaneously to a 
change in the volume of currency, in which case such changes have no impact on prices, even 
in the short run. However, this case is a priori unlikely. In many parts of West Africa, 
informal sector agents intermediate between poor households and the formal banking sector. 
The intermediaries hold assets with respect to the formal banking sector (in the form of bank 
deposits) and liabilities with respect to households. In this kind of market it is likely that an 
injection of cash into the economy will lead to an adjustment of bank deposits only with a lag 
of some months.  
  More formally, we amend equations (3-4) as follows: 
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where mt is the value of the stock of currency in circulation at the end of month t, and rt is the 
base interest rate at the end of month t. Note that a permanent change in m can have a 
permanent impact on the price level. If more cash is injected into the economy, then ceteris 
paribus prices will start to rise and deposits will start to fall. But there is likely to be inertia in 
both. Given the initial rise in prices, and a fixed real demand for M1, the eventual fall in 
deposits will be less than the initial cash injection. So the long run will see a larger total 
nominal money stock and higher prices, but the price increase is less than proportional to the 
initial cash injection. There is no stable long-run ratio of the volume of cash to the price level, 
even when we condition on determinants of money demand such as the interest rate. 7
  One important caveat in the interpretation of the fitted model is that there is no variable 
in equations (6-7) to capture changes in real income. GDP data for the UEMOA countries are 
reported only on an annual basis, and we will be fitting a monthly model. However, over the 
relatively short period of 8 years that we will be considering, it is likely that variations in 
monthly income are dominated by the seasonal agricultural cycle. No large income shocks 
appear in the annual GDP data for the period. So the seasonal and trend components of 
z
it P in
the regression equations ought to be a reasonable proxy for the income variable.  
 The  policy  variables  m and r appear in the regression equations with a lag: they 
represent the value of the variable at the end of the month before the price index is observed. 
The values of policy variables are determined by the BCEAO on a monthly basis, and the raw 
data for the price indices are collected on a monthly basis (the process of data collection is 
often stretched over several weeks within the month). So the frequency of observations in the 
model matches the frequency with which the variables are observed. Since mt-1 and rt-1 are 
predetermined variables, they are weakly exogenous to prices at t, and the parameters Ii and 
\i can be estimated consistently without recourse to an instrumental variables estimator. Of 
course they might not be strictly exogenous, since BCEAO policy interventions might well 
depend on observed inflation. Fielding (1999) and Shortland and Stasavage (2003a,b) explore 
this issue.
  One potential problem in interpreting a model of the kind represented by equations (6-7) 
is that the estimated effect of 'm on prices partly might be partly due to a correlation between 
'm and public expenditure. For example, one might worry that food subsidies (such as those 
introduced in many UEMOA countries in the wake of the devaluation) are correlated with 
public spending, which is in turn correlated with money creation. In this case there is no 
straightforward interpretation of the estimated effect of 'm on prices. However, the BCEAO 
has a number of financial instruments (for example, foreign liabilities) with which is can 
sterilize the impact of short-run fluctuations in government borrowing on money creation 
(Fielding, 1999). The correlation coefficient for deseasonalized 'm and the deseasonalized 
rate of growth of BCEAO claims on governments in our sample period (1994m4-2002m7) is 
only 0.178.
8 So we can be reasonably sure that the estimated coefficient on 'm does not suffer 
from any substantial bias from a correlation between 'm and public spending. 
                                                
8 The corresponding  t-ratio is 1.801, so there is a marginally significant (but very small) correlation between the 
two variables. 8
  Having fitted the model represented by equations (6-7) to our monthly data, we will be 
in a position to map out the way in which individual prices series respond to a change in m or 
r. Before explaining how this is done, it should be noted that our aim is to explore the impact 
of changes in policy on prices, rather than to model policy and prices simultaneously. We will 
use the fitted model parameters to compute the impact of a change in a policy variable on 
prices, conditional on the assumption that the policy variable does not change again in 
response to the price changes. In this sense, the policy variable changes we explore are not 
intended to represent “typical” historical policy episodes. Rather, we investigate the 
consequences of monetary policy interventions from the point of view of the policymaker, 
treating the policy change as a strictly exogenous event.
9
  In the section 4, we will first present the fitted model of prices. We will then examine 
the implications of the model for the way in which food and non-food prices in each country 
evolve in response to changes in the currency stock or in the base interest rate. The focus of 
attention will be on the first 12 months after the change in policy, since we think it unlikely 
that any policy maker will work with a time horizon longer than a year. Though the pattern of 
food and non-food price responses is of interest in itself, one way of expanding on the 
implications of the results is to plot out the response of aggregate price indices of different 
kinds. The share food in the consumption of households with higher incomes is likely to be 
lower than that of lower income households. We will construct price response profiles for 
hypothetical households with different shares of food expenditure in total consumption. In 
this way, we can explore the possibility that households at different income levels are affected 
by monetary policy changes in an asymmetric way. We can also explore any regional 




Monthly data for the 14 price series 
z
it p  are reported in the BCEAO publication, Indices
Hamonisés des Prix à la Consommation des Etats de l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest 
Africaine. The corresponding monthly inflation series are depicted in Figures 1-2. These are 
                                                
9 Thus we are not directly concerned with impact of monetary policy shocks. Our aim is not to identify the 
consequences of unpredictable changes in monetary policy variables, but rather to inform policy by estimating 
the consequences of a planned policy change. We do make the assumption that the impact of unpredictable 
changes in m and r is the same as the impact of predictable changes; when looking at data at a monthly 
frequency, this seems to us to be a reasonable assumption. 9
sub-components of the harmonized index of consumer prices (IHPC). The weights given to 
the two components in the IHPC vary from one country to another, but always sum to unity. 
The largest weight on food prices (0.5001) is in Mali; the lowest (0.3221) is in Côte d’Ivoire. 
This reflects a substantial difference in per capita GDP between the two countries: 0.166 
million CFA Francs in Mali (€255) and 0.421 million CFA Francs (€640) in Côte d’Ivoire in 
2001. The effect of the 1994 devaluation is very marked in many of the inflation series, 
particularly in 
r
it p ' , and the distribution of inflation over a sample including early 1994 is 
markedly leptokurtic. We do not attempt to model the devaluation episode, and our sample 
period begins in 1994m4 and ends in 2002m7. It can be seen from the figures that over this 
period food prices have been markedly more volatile than non-food prices. We will see 
whether this difference is associated with varying degrees of sensitivity to monetary policy. 
  Monthly data for mt and rt are taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics,
lines 14A and 60 respectively. Note that rt is the monthly annualized interest rate. The IMF 
reports M0 figures for each individual country, because CFA notes are issued by national 
branches of the BCEAO. But these notes differ only by serial number, and circulate freely in 
all countries of the UEMOA. The mt series used in the fitted model is the logarithm of the 
sum of these “national” currency stocks.
11 Figure 3 illustrates the two series. It can be seen 
that there is a great deal of seasonal variation in mt; this is because cash is one of the principal 
financial assets used by farmers to smooth consumption over the agricultural cycle. The 
BCEAO allows the stock of currency in circulation to vary over the year to match the 
seasonal variations money demand. For this reason the seasonal component of 
z
it P  explains a 
large part of the variation in prices conditional on mt. As Figure 3 shows, the seasonal pattern 
is very regular. There is also a marked break in the mt series after the devaluation in January 
1994: since the devaluation, the money stock has been allowed to expand at a much faster 
rate.
[Figures 1-3 and Table 1 here] 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 All results reported in this and the following section were produced using Pc-Give 9.0 and Pc-Fiml 9.0. 
11 Data on the cross-border movement of notes are limited. The BCEAO makes periodic attempts to track the 
billets déplacés, figures for which are sometimes reported in the Rapport Annuel de la Zone Franc, published by 
the Banque de France. These indicate that a substantial fraction of the currency issued travels from one country 
to another. 10
3.2 Time-series properties of the data
Table 1 reports ADF unit root statistics for the series of interest. For the inflation series, we 
will make inferences about orders of integration on the basis of panel unit root test statistics. 
It is highly improbable that the food price inflation series will have different orders of 
integration in the different UEMOA countries; the same is true for non-food price inflation. 
The first part of the table shows individual ADF t-ratios for the 
f
it p '  and 
r
it p '  variables, and 
corresponding t-bar panel unit root statistics (Im et al., 2003). The null that the series are I(1) 
can be rejected at the 1% level in both cases. For 'mt and 'rt the univariate unit root tests also 
indicate rejection of the null at the 1% level. 
  Our model also assumes that the various price series are cointegrated. We test this 
assumption by conducting panel unit root tests for three sets of equilibrium correction terms 
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The bottom part of Table 1 reports the results of these tests. In all three cases the null that the 









it p p 1 1     this is only true when the alternative allows for a deterministic linear trend. 
In other words, we can assume that prices across the different countries of the UEMOA are 
cointegrated as long as we accept that there are secular trends in the relative price series. 
  On the basis of the results in Table 1, the variables appearing in the model outlined in 
the previous section will all be treated as I(0) variables. 
4. The Fitted Model 
4.1 Parameter estimates 
The parameters of model represented by equations (7-8) for the seven countries are estimated 
by FIML. (OLS is not efficient because the regression residuals are correlated with each 
other.) The full fitted model is reported in Table A1 in the appendix; the lag order in this 
model (one) is favored by the Hannan-Quinn and Akaike information criteria. The 
deterministic components of the model are a seasonally varying intercept and a linear trend. 
Two alternative estimates are reported. The first is an unrestricted version and the second 
incorporates a set of parameter restrictions, some coefficients being set to zero so as to 
minimize the Hannan-Quinn information criterion. The response profiles discussed below are 
based on the restricted model, though the general stylized facts presented are also true if we 
use the unrestricted model. 11
  As reported in the summary statistics table (Table A2 in the appendix), the equilibrium 
correction terms are jointly significant in the unrestricted model at the 5% level in all 
equations except those for Côte d’Ivoire. Note that in the case of Côte d’Ivoire there is a 
single equilibrium correction term, reflecting the assumption that Ivorian prices are not 
affected by prices elsewhere in the UEMOA in the long run. If any of the other pairs of 








it p p 1 1    ) are included in the Ivorian 
equations, the coefficients on them are not significantly different from zero. Neither are they 
jointly significant when all are added simultaneously. In fact, the Ivorian equilibrium 




CIVt p p 1 1     is significant only at the 10% level in the 
f
CIVt p '  equation, 
and not significant at all in the 
r
CIVt p '  equation. Nevertheless, the Hannan-Quinn criterion 
indicates the inclusion of the equilibrium correction term in the 
f
CIVt p '  equation, and the 
response profiles discussed below do incorporate internal price convergence in Côte d’Ivoire. 
The whole system is dynamically stable, and a temporary shock to any one variable does not 
cause a permanent change in any of the variables in the model.  
Table A2 also reports Chow Test statistics for parameter stability. These are constructed 
by fitting the model to a sample that excludes the last n observations, which are then used as a 
forecast period. The statistics reported are for n = 6 to n = 42 (i.e., for six months to 3½ 
years).
12 The forecast errors are not significant at the 5% level, except for forecast periods 
restricted to the last year of the sample. So there is some concern that there is a structural 
break in the last year of the sample period. However, fitting the model to a data set ending in 
2001 does not substantially alter either the parameter estimates or the response profiles 
discussed below. 
  We do not dwell in any detail on the parameter estimates in Table A1. However, a few 
points about the fitted model are worthy of note. Firstly, changes in the interest rate rt do not 
have any significant effect in the Ivorian price equations, and the interest rate coefficients are 
set to zero in the restricted model. Because Ivorian prices are not affected by other prices in 
the long run, this means that permanent changes in rt have only a short-run effect on prices in 
the system. However, changes in the currency stock mt do have a substantial and significant 
impact in the Ivorian price equations, so permanent changes in mt do lead to permanent 
changes in prices across the UEMOA. Secondly, all the lagged inflation terms have a 
                                                
12 In the notation of Doornik and Hendry (2001), these are V[e] forecast error statistics that allow for parameter 
uncertainty. 12
significant impact in at least one of the other equations, so the short-run evolution of prices is 
the result of a complex web of interactions between food and non-food prices in the different 
countries.
4.2 The response profiles for food and non-food prices
Figures 4-7 illustrate the response of food and non-food prices in the seven countries prices to 
a (permanent) unit change in the currency stock mt and in the interest rate rt over the first 12 
months after the change. These charts correspond to the data recorded in Table 3, which 
reports the average monthly inflation rate for each price series at four, eight and 12 months 
after the change, with the corresponding standard deviations of inflation around this mean.
13
  In interpreting these figures, two scaling factors need to be taken into account. Firstly, 
the inflation rates are computed on a monthly basis, so a 1% inflation rate corresponds to an 
annualized rate of a little over 12%. Secondly, the hypothetical unit changes in the two policy 
variables ought to be interpreted in terms of the observed distributions of (deseasonalized) 
'mt and 'rt, which are reported in Table 2. The standard deviation of 'mt is about 0.04, 
though changes in mt as large as 0.16 are observed. For rt the corresponding figures are 0.004 
and 0.025 (i.e., 4 and 25 basis points). So, for example, a change in mt equal to the largest 
observed change in recent years ought to have an impact of about one sixth the magnitude of 
the standardized figures in Table 3. If the table reports a monthly inflation rate of 1% for a 
unit change in mt, this implies an annualized inflation rate of about 2% for the largest change 
in mt actually observed. 
[Figures 4-7 and Tables 2-3 here] 
Figures 4-5 show the response of prices to a change in the currency stock. There is a lot more 
cross-country variation in the response of food prices (
f
it p ) than in that of non-food prices 
(
r
it p ). In the case of 
f
it p , the response of prices on impact is insignificantly different from 
zero in four of the countries. But in the two largest countries, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, the 
response to a unit increase in mt on impact is a price increase of over 15%. By contrast, food 
prices in Mali fall by around 25% on impact. The possible reasons for the price fall are 
discussed in section 1 above. By month 12, prices in all countries have begun to converge on 
their common long-run asymptote, a price increase of around 10%, although there is still 
                                                
13 I.e., standard deviations of the hypothetical inflation rate, not standard errors of the inflation estimates. 13
some substantial variation between the lowest and highest food price level. In the case of 
r
it p ,
the largest effects on impact (in Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Togo) are only around 10%, and 
in the other four countries they are insignificantly different from zero. By month 12, there has 
been rather more convergence on the asymptote than in the case of 
f
it p .
  In Table 3 these effects are quantified in more detail. Over the first four months after a 
hypothetical unit increase in mt, average monthly food price inflation rates are highest in Côte 
d’Ivoire, Senegal and Togo. In these countries, the inflation rate is about 3-4% per month. For 
the largest observed change in mt (0.16), this corresponds to an annualized monthly inflation 
rate of 6-8%. At the other extreme, a unit increase in mt delivers an average rate of food price 
deflation in Mali of over 2% per month in the first four months. Price effects in the other four 
countries lie in between these two extremes. If our perspective changes to the 12-month 
horizon these stylized differences are still present, but the magnitude of the cross-country 
variation is much smaller. Average monthly inflation in Mali is now positive, as Malian prices 
are pulled up to the UEMOA average, and average inflation rates among the other countries 
are much less dispersed. 
  Table 3 shows that the variation in the response of non-food price to a unit increase in 
mt is smaller. Over the first four months, average monthly inflation rates vary between about 
2% (Burkina Faso) and about 3% (Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Niger). If we consider a 12-
month horizon, these differences have all but disappeared. 
  The profiles for change in the interest rate, depicted in Figures 6-7, look very different 
from those for a change in the currency stock. There is one substantial price response on 
impact: a unit fall in rt generates an increase in Togolese food prices of over 300%. There is a 
similar effect in Mali, but with a magnitude about half that in Togo. Otherwise, the estimated 
price responses are all less than 100%, which is very small considering that the average 
change in the interest rate is only about 0.4%. The figures show that in all countries the price 
response profiles decay quite quickly to zero. Table 3 reinforces this impression. Over a four-
month horizon Togo stands out as the one country with a substantial monthly inflation rate 
(79%) in response to the unit interest rate change. The effects in all other countries are very 
small, even at the four-month horizon. Over longer horizons the average monthly inflation 
rate in Togo is very much closer to the UEMOA average. 
  What do these figures have to say about the cross-country distribution of the costs of an 
increase in the stock of currency or a decrease in the interest rate? On average, the rate of 14
growth of the currency stock is quite small, but from time to time there are substantial 
monetary expansions and contractions. So it makes sense to focus on the volatility of food 
prices that arises in response to a monetary expansion or contraction. A simple measure of 
volatility is the standard deviation of inflation in the different countries implicit in the price 
response profiles, that is, the extent of variation in inflation as prices adjust to their new mean 
level. Suppose that the BCEAO decides to increase (decrease) the stock of CFA currency by 
10%, implying a general price increase (decrease) of about 1% in the long run. Such a change 
in mt is larger than the average we have observed in recent years, but smaller than the largest 
observed change. This policy change might be motivated by a desire to boost (reduce) 
aggregate demand in response to a negative (positive) macroeconomic shock or – less likely – 
by an increase (decrease) in borrowing by one or other of the member state governments. 
Table 3 implies that the cross-country asymmetries in aggregate price responses will largely 
be due to asymmetries in the response of food prices. At all time horizons, the largest standard 
deviation in monthly inflation is in Mali (about 1.5% at the four-month horizon, for a 10% 
change in mt). But the standard deviations of prices in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal (0.8% and 
1.2% at the four-month horizon) are also relatively high. Given that recent average inflation 
rates in the UEMOA have been of Western European magnitude – i.e., less than 0.5% per 
month – these effects are substantial. By contrast, the figures for the other four countries are 
much smaller, because food prices there respond much more smoothly to the change in mt. So 
consumers in Mali, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal will bear the burden of sudden (and, if the 
change in mt is a shock, unpredicted) price movements. 
  If we consider an interest rate change, the picture is very different. Suppose that the 
BCEAO reduces (increases) rt by three quarters of a percentage point. This represents a 
change of about two sample standard deviations. Table 3 implies that over a four-month 
horizon, the standard deviation of food price inflation in Togo will be about 1.3%.
14 The 
standard deviation of food price inflation in Mali is about half as large as this, and in Burkina 
Faso and Senegal about one third as large; the corresponding figures for the other countries 
are very much smaller. So consumers in Togo and (to a lesser extent) Mali will bear the 
burden of sudden (and, if the change in rt is a shock, unpredicted) interest rate movements.
15
                                                
14 1.3% _(0.75)x(1.7162%), from the last entry in the first column in Table 3. 
15 Admittedly, there were a couple of interest changes in excess of 10 basis points in the wake of the devaluation. 
But such changes are not typical of 1995 onwards. 15
4.3 The response profiles for hypothetical income groups
We have seen that the burden of a change in mt, in terms of inflation volatility, falls on 
consumers in Mali, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal; and that the burden of a change in rt falls on 
consumers in Togo and Mali. Which consumers: the rich or the poor? Since food prices are 
more sensitive to changes in monetary policy instruments than non-food prices, it is likely to 
be the poor. Figures 8-14 and Table 4 provide evidence on the magnitude of this effect. 
[Figures 8-14 and Table 4 here] 
  Each of the figures shows the response profiles of the aggregate consumer price index 
for three hypothetical households in a particular country, following either a unit increase in mt
or a unit decrease in rt. The “middle income household” index is the Ivorian IHPC. The “low 
income household” index is constructed with a weight on food prices twice that in the Ivorian 
IHPC. The “high income household” index is constructed with a weight on food prices half 
that in the Ivorian IHPC.
16 Of course, consumption patterns between high and low-income 
households differ in ways other than the share of food in total expenditure, and we do not 
have enough degrees of freedom to fit a more disaggregated model of consumer prices. 
Nevertheless, the share of food in total consumption is likely to be the major difference 
between rich and poor households. 
  The figures show that in three countries – Benin, Burkina Faso and Togo – the three 
response profiles for a change in mt are virtually identical. In these countries, food and non-
food prices respond in a similar way to the initial change in mt. In Senegal the same is true 
from the second month onwards, but inflation is much higher for the low-income group in the 
first month after the new currency creation. In Côte d’Ivoire, the initial upward jump in the 
price index for low-income households is also much larger than for high-income households, 
and moreover the gap between the price indices persists for some time. (Price convergence is 
relatively slow in Côte d’Ivoire.) In Mali, there is virtually no initial jump in the high-income 
price index, because the increase in non-food prices is offset by Mali’s idiosyncratic decrease 
in food prices. But for low-income households, who spend a larger fraction of their income on 
food, there is a substantial drop in food prices after the increase in mt, followed by a steady 
increase as food prices converge on non-food prices. So the price index for low-income 16
households is much more volatile. In Niger, prices are somewhat higher for the high-income 
group in the 12 months following the increase in mt, although the initial price increase is 
relatively small, and for all income groups the transition to the steady state is relatively 
smooth. This implies a relatively low inflation variance for all income groups. 
  Table 4 indicates the implications of these responses for the average inflation rate and 
the standard deviation of inflation in the 12 months following a unit change in mt. The table 
implies that groups experiencing the most inflation volatility are low-income households in 
Mali and Senegal. A 10% change in the currency stock leads to a standard deviation of 
inflation of 1% over the next four months for the poor in Mali, and of 0.9% for the poor in 
Senegal. Other groups experiencing relatively high inflation volatility are middle-income 
households in Mali and Senegal and low-income households in Côte d’Ivoire (all with a four-
month standard deviation of over 0.6%). There is also substantial volatility for high-income 
households in Mali and Senegal, and for middle and high-income households in Côte 
d’Ivoire.
  The response profiles for changes in the interest rate are rather different. Only in Togo, 
and to a lesser extent Mali, Burkina Faso and Senegal, are there any quantitatively substantial 
effects. In all cases the rise in prices following a fall in the interest rate is larger for low-
income households, although in Burkina Faso and Senegal this difference is negligibly small. 
Table 4 implies that a change in rt equal to three quarters of a percentage point will lead to a 
standard deviation of inflation in the following four months equal to 0.8% for low-income 
households in Togo.
17 The corresponding standard deviations for low-income households in 
Mali, and for middle-income households in Togo, are about half this. In Burkina Faso and 
Senegal, all income groups experience a magnitude of inflation volatility that is marginally 
smaller again. 
  So, in general, monthly movements in either one of the monetary policy instruments can 
be expected to generate more price volatility for the poor than for the rich. But the volatility 
effects are concentrated in a limited number of countries: Mali, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire for 
changes in mt; Mali, Senegal and Togo for changes in rt.
                                                                                                                                                        
16 The Ivorian IHPC weight on food items is 0.3221. 
17 0.8% _(0.75)x(1.1028%), from the last entry in the last column in Table 4. 17
4.4 A note on orders of magnitude 
How important are the magnitudes indicated above? If one just considers a single 
unanticipated change in a monetary policy instrument, then the conclusion will be that there is 
a small – but not entirely negligible – impact on welfare. For example, a 10% contraction of 
the stock of currency causes the aggregate price index for our hypothetical low-income 
Malian household to rise by about 1.4% in the first month, a figure that has declined to 0.2% 
by the fourth month. If all of this price increase is met by a reduction in food consumption 
(because household income and other expenditure commitments, such as rent, are fixed in the 
short term), and if each household member eats one meal per day, then the consumption 
foregone is equal to about 1½ meals per person. 
  However, if one considers the persistent volatility in inflation that is likely to result 
from frequent changes in monetary policy instruments (and remember that the standard 
deviation of deseasonalized monthly 'mt is over 4%), the figures calculated above are 
substantial relative to the inflation targets used by central banks in OECD countries. For 
example, the Bank of England aims to keep aggregate annualized inflation within one 
percentage point either side of a target rate. We have seen that a 10% change in mt results in 
an immediate monthly change in food prices in Mali of 2.5% (Figure 4), and a corresponding 
change in aggregate prices for low-income households of  1.4% (Figure 10). 
5. Summary and Conclusion    
We have fitted a model of urban food and non-food prices to monthly time-series data for 
different countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union, in order to examine 
the asymmetries of price response that arise after a change in a monetary policy instrument. 
Although the countries share a common currency and a single central bank (the BCEAO), and 
although prices across the monetary union are cointegrated, there are some significant short-
run asymmetries, both across countries and across commodities. We have explored the 
consequences of these asymmetries for different income groups in different member states. 
Households in a subset of the countries – especially poor households – bear the brunt of the 
price volatility that occurs in the wake of a change in the value of one of the instruments. 
  This does not mean that the BCEAO should abandon monetary policy. The policy 
instruments at its disposal are a potentially valuable set of tools to combat the price 
uncertainty that arises from exogenous shocks and increases the vulnerability of the poor. 
However, policymakers do need to be aware of the distributional asymmetries that arise as a 18
consequence of monetary policy interventions. There may be a need for targeted measures 
(for example, food subsidies), to reduce the price volatility that faces certain income groups in 
certain countries following a large monetary adjustment.  
  We should stress that the results here relate to urban prices. High-frequency time-series 
data for rural areas are not available. The heterogeneity we observe between cities and 
between income groups suggests that there might well be some heterogeneity between urban 
and rural areas. This is an important topic for future research. 
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Table 1: Tests for Stationarity 
The sample is 1994(4)-2002(9) for prices; 1994(4)-2002(7) for m and r. 
Individual ADF t-statistics for Differenced Variables 




ADF t  lag order ADF t lag order
Burkina Faso  -9.9153  0 -13.945 0 
Benin -8.6815  1 -7.4676 1 
Mali -10.253  0 -8.5581 1 
Niger -8.3761  0 -6.0275 1 
Senegal -8.2441  1 -10.382 0 
Côte d'Ivoire  -8.1660  0 -4.1312 2 
Togo -8.6025  0 -7.4531 2 
t-bar -8.8912  -8.2806
(1% cv = –2.27)
'm 'r
BCEAO -9.7693  0 -6.6028 1 
(1% cv = –3.50)
Individual ADF t-statistics for ecmf (p
f(i)-p
f(CIV)) and ecmr (p
r(i)-p
r(CIV))
(ADF regressions include seasonal intercepts plus trend)
 ecmf  ecmr 
ADF t  lag order ADF t lag order
Burkina Faso  -3.2758  0 -4.2054 0 
Benin -3.7748  0 -3.2111 0 
Mali -2.8399  0 -5.3792 0 
Niger -3.1084  0 -3.6263 0 
Senegal -2.2512  0 -3.9618 0 
Togo -3.1127  0 -4.2757 0 
t-bar -3.0605  -4.1099
(1% cv = –2.91)
Individual ADF t-statistics for (p
f(i)-p
r(i))
(ADF regressions include seasonal intercepts but no trend)
 ADF  t lag order
Burkina Faso    -2.3758 0  
Benin   -2.7272 0  
Mali   -2.1682 2  
Niger   -1.5541 2  
Senegal   -2.7111 0  
Côte d'Ivoire    -2.1599 1  
Togo   -3.0353 0  
t-bar   -2.3902
(1% cv = –2.27)
Table 2: Summary Statistics for BCEAO M0 Growth and Base Interest Rate 
mean std.  dev.  minimum  maximum 
'm (monthly)   0.78% 4.37% -7.74%  15.66% 
'r (monthly) -0.08% 0.37% -2.50%    0.75% 20
Table 3: Simulated average values of monthly food / non-food price 
inflation in response to a unit increase in m / a unit decrease in r, for 
4, 8 and 12 months after the change.
Figures are in percent. 
12 month figures pf with r  pr with r  pf with m  pr with m 
Burkina Faso  -0.00667  -0.00209   0.01084   0.00845 
(std. dev.)   0.31385   0.33845   0.02022   0.02035 
Benin  -0.00241 -0.00376   0.01096   0.00935 
(std. dev.)   0.15379   0.11329   0.01751   0.01485 
Mali   0.01239  -0.00796   0.00719   0.00936 
(std. dev.)   0.47404   0.07953   0.08382   0.01674 
Niger  -0.00874 -0.00866   0.00922   0.01005 
(std. dev.)   0.09569   0.04453   0.00719   0.02683 
Senegal  -0.00431 -0.00850   0.01143   0.00946 
(std. dev.)   0.26583   0.23720   0.06183   0.03059 
Côte d'Ivoire  -0.00276  -0.00622   0.01170   0.00911 
(std. dev.)   0.01157   0.01395   0.04581   0.02799 
Togo   0.03927  -0.00772   0.01492   0.00890 
(std. dev.)   1.06060   0.02218   0.03040   0.01966 
8 month figures  pf with r  pr with r  pf with m  pr with m 
Burkina Faso   0.00614   0.00796   0.01547   0.01235 
(std. dev.)   0.39251   0.42381   0.02383   0.02447 
Benin   0.01180  -0.00254   0.01656   0.01480 
(std. dev.)   0.19092   0.14197   0.01934   0.01565 
Mali   0.04736  -0.01124   0.00389   0.01469 
(std. dev.)   0.59067   0.09941   0.10486   0.01853 
Niger  -0.00258 -0.02020   0.01222   0.01669 
(std. dev.)   0.11922   0.05141   0.00705   0.03131 
Senegal   0.00952  -0.00429   0.01779   0.01559 
(std. dev.)   0.33214   0.29707   0.07660   0.03663 
Côte d'Ivoire  -0.00057  -0.01149   0.01858   0.01434 
(std. dev.)   0.01390   0.01435   0.05599   0.03372 
Togo   0.16432  -0.00752   0.02560   0.01354 
(std. dev.)   1.30850   0.02741   0.03256   0.02311 
4 month figures  pf with r  pr with r  pf with m  pr with m 
Burkina Faso   0.17199   0.06641   0.01603  0.020488 
(std. dev.)   0.53062   0.64004   0.03579  0.034752 
Benin   0.02021  -0.02747   0.02550  0.023505 
(std. dev.)   0.28808   0.20990   0.02488  0.017741 
Mali   0.17661   0.00149  -0.02238  0.024517 
(std. dev.)   0.87713   0.14975   0.15421  0.022423 
Niger   0.05771  -0.00295   0.01428  0.033702 
(std. dev.)   0.15251   0.06865   0.00979  0.038759 
Senegal   0.11220   0.09245   0.02961  0.031990 
(std. dev.)   0.47789   0.42352   0.11531  0.049094 
Côte d'Ivoire  -0.00196  -0.00867   0.03845  0.029352 
(std. dev.)   0.01882   0.02026   0.07914  0.045291 
Togo   0.78888   0.00098   0.03620  0.021365 
(std. dev.)   1.71620   0.03764   0.04422  0.032684 21
Table 4: Simulated average values of monthly consumer price inflation for 
three hypothetical income groups in response to a unit increase in m / a 
unit decrease in r, for 4, 8 and 12 months after the change.
Figures are in percent. 
12 month figs  high / m  mid / m  low / m  high / r  mid / r  low / r 
Burkina  Faso    0.00883   0.00922   0.00999 -0.00282 -0.00356 -0.00504 
(std. dev.)   0.01600   0.01257   0.01198   0.26623   0.20728   0.18572 
Benin    0.00961   0.00987   0.01039 -0.00354 -0.00333 -0.00289 
(std. dev.)   0.01488   0.01507   0.01593   0.11847   0.12428   0.13743 
Mali    0.00901   0.00866   0.00796 -0.00468 -0.00140   0.00515 
(std. dev.)   0.02244   0.03253   0.05623   0.09111   0.15174   0.30117 
Niger    0.00992   0.00978   0.00951 -0.00867 -0.00869 -0.00871 
(std. dev.)   0.02240   0.01806   0.01010   0.05031   0.05756   0.07466 
Senegal    0.00978   0.01010   0.01073 -0.00783 -0.00715 -0.00580 
(std. dev.)   0.03469   0.03933   0.04961   0.24115   0.24537   0.25458 
Côte  d'Ivoire    0.00952   0.00994   0.01078 -0.00566 -0.00510 -0.00399 
(std. dev.)   0.03079   0.03362   0.03938   0.01138   0.00925   0.00784 
Togo    0.00987   0.01084   0.01278 -0.00015   0.00742   0.02255 
(std. dev.)   0.01752   0.01707   0.02124   0.17173   0.34192   0.68327 
    
8 month figs  high / m  mid / m  low / m  high / r  mid / r  low / r 
Burkina Faso   0.01285   0.01336   0.01436   0.00767   0.00737   0.00679 
(std. dev.)   0.01862   0.01376   0.01263   0.33308   0.25890   0.23155 
Benin    0.01508   0.01536   0.01593 -0.00023   0.00208   0.00670 
(std. dev.)   0.01566   0.01592   0.01713   0.14836   0.15544   0.17131 
Mali    0.01295   0.01121   0.00773 -0.00181   0.00764   0.02651 
(std. dev.)   0.02716   0.04049   0.07046   0.11399   0.18942   0.37542 
Niger    0.01597   0.01525   0.01381 -0.01737 -0.01453 -0.00885 
(std. dev.)   0.02575   0.02025   0.00985   0.06081   0.07117   0.09342 
Senegal    0.01595   0.01630   0.01701 -0.00207   0.00017   0.00461 
(std. dev.)   0.04196   0.04795   0.06109   0.30195   0.30714   0.31842 
Côte  d'Ivoire    0.01502   0.01571   0.01707 -0.00973 -0.00797 -0.00446 
(std. dev.)   0.03722   0.04078   0.04796   0.01196   0.01017   0.00972 
Togo   0.01548   0.01742   0.02131   0.02015   0.04783   0.10318 
(std. dev.)   0.01935   0.01758   0.02142   0.21168   0.42168   0.84287 
    
4 month figs  high / m  mid / m  low / m  high / r  mid / r  low / r 
Burkina Faso   0.01977   0.01905   0.01762   0.08341   0.10042   0.13443 
(std. dev.)   0.02585   0.01845   0.01788   0.49323   0.36440   0.28252 
Benin    0.02383   0.02415   0.02479 -0.01979 -0.01211   0.00325 
(std. dev.)   0.01778   0.01832   0.02073   0.22122   0.23315   0.25843 
Mali    0.01697   0.00941 -0.00569   0.02969   0.05790   0.11430 
(std. dev.)   0.04051   0.06150   0.10521   0.16603   0.27737   0.55522 
Niger   0.03057   0.02745   0.02119   0.00682   0.01659   0.03613 
(std. dev.)   0.03109   0.02343   0.00843   0.08064   0.09356   0.12096 
Senegal   0.03161   0.03122   0.03045   0.09563   0.09881   0.10517 
(std. dev.)   0.05873   0.06901   0.09062   0.43106   0.43911   0.45660 
Côte  d'Ivoire    0.03082   0.03228   0.03521 -0.00759 -0.00651 -0.00435 
(std. dev.)   0.05067   0.05609   0.06701   0.01729   0.01506   0.01416 
Togo   0.02375   0.02614   0.03092   0.12783   0.25476   0.50854 










































































.15 BCEAO rediscount rate
Figure 3: BCEAO nominal M0 and base interest rate, 1990-2002 















Figure 4: Reponse of p
f to a unit increase in m, months 1-12 24












Figure 5: Reponse of p
r to a unit increase in m, months 1-12 













Figure 6: Reponse of p
f to a unit decrease in r, months 1-12 25











Figure 7: Reponse of p
r to a unit decrease in r, months 1-12 














Figure 8: Response of hypothetical price indices for high, middle and low income groups to a 
unit increase in m (case A) and a unit decrease in r (case B), Burkina Faso 26














Figure 9: Response of hypothetical price indices for high, middle and low income groups to a 
unit increase in m (case A) and a unit decrease in r (case B), Benin 















Figure 10: Response of hypothetical price indices for high, middle and low income groups to 
a unit increase in m (case A) and a unit decrease in r (case B), Mali 27
















Figure 11: Response of hypothetical price indices for high, middle and low income groups to 
a unit increase in m (case A) and a unit decrease in r (case B), Niger 















Figure 12: Response of hypothetical price indices for high, middle and low income groups to 
a unit increase in m (case A) and a unit decrease in r (case B), Senegal 28
















Figure 13: Response of hypothetical price indices for high, middle and low income groups to 
a unit increase in m (case A) and a unit decrease in r (case B), Côte d’Ivoire 














Figure 14: Response of hypothetical price indices for high, middle and low income groups to 
a unit increase in m (case A) and a unit decrease in r (case B), Togo 29
Table A1: The Fitted Price Equations 
All equations are estimated by FIML and include a linear trend & seasonal 












f_bfa unrestricted restricted 
Variable coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. 
'p
f_bfa-1 +0.00841 0.12834 0.12812       
'p
r_bfa-1 -0.01933 0.22694 0.25329       
'p
f_ben-1 -0.01601 0.10579 0.09795       
'p
r_ben-1 +0.06967 0.20718 0.20213       
'p
f_mal-1 -0.06856 0.12980 0.14551       
'p
r_mal-1 -0.02754 0.15498 0.14222       
'p
f_ner-1 +0.13809 0.17413 0.17693       
'p
r_ner-1 -0.05404 0.31359 0.27549       
'p
f_sen-1 +0.10247 0.15563 0.15845       
'p
r_sen-1 -0.59765 0.46649 0.41548       
'p
f_civ-1 -0.36272 0.21943 0.16782  -0.30150 0.13169 0.10490 
'p
r_civ-1 -0.15183 0.46966 0.43223       
'p
f_tog-1 +0.24823 0.10793 0.10244  +0.22930 0.06597 0.07011 
'p
r_tog-1 -0.08399 0.21493 0.18925       
'm-1 -0.16035 0.14961 0.12376       
'i-1 -0.42036 0.84899 0.81942       
ecm
fr
-1 -0.00299 0.05799  0.06658       
ecm
r_bfa-1 +0.32604 0.16327  0.15081  +0.23653 0.11756  0.12244 
ecm
f_bfa-1 -0.28445 0.05890  0.05823  -0.27612 0.050801 0.051523 
V +0.02310    +0.02187   
        
'p
r_bfa unrestricted restricted 
Variable coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. 
'p
f_bfa-1 +0.02736 0.05823 0.057433      
'p
r_bfa-1 -0.12627 0.10321 0.13495  -0.17316 0.07688 0.09615 
'p
f_ben-1 -0.04982 0.04801 0.047705      
'p
r_ben-1 +0.30286 0.09408 0.081759 +0.26017 0.06602  0.05833 
'p
f_mal-1 -0.19766 0.05891 0.068736 -0.19469 0.04481  0.05627 
'p
r_mal-1 +0.06063 0.07034 0.068189      
'p
f_ner-1 +0.11619 0.07904 0.085541 0.11389  0.05708  0.06960 
'p
r_ner-1 -0.02796 0.14238 0.14903       
'p
f_sen-1 +0.09917 0.07064 0.067634 0.11864  0.04823  0.05079 
'p
r_sen-1 +0.07533 0.21164 0.19264       
'p
f_civ-1 -0.22421 0.09949 0.079048 -0.20604 0.06010  0.04912 
'p
r_civ-1 -0.00412 0.21316 0.20089       
'p
f_tog-1 +0.02001 0.04903 0.036363      
'p
r_tog-1 -0.04051 0.09756 0.074093      
'm-1 +0.07261 0.06799 0.059137      
'r-1 -0.88845 0.38566 0.54319  -0.91867 +0.26666 0.27437 
ecm
fr
-1 -0.00213 0.02634  0.024636      
ecm
r_bfa-1 -0.33174 0.07515  0.083387 -0.28885 0.05737  0.08089 
ecm
f_bfa-1 +0.00729 0.02615  0.026235      
V +0.01049    +0.00974   30
Table A1 (Continued)
'p
f_ben Unrestricted restricted 
Variable Coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. 
'p
f_bfa-1 +0.05399 0.15579 0.13810       
'p
r_bfa-1 -0.17330 0.26161 0.22756       
'p
f_ben-1 -0.03202 0.13670 0.11126       
'p
r_ben-1 +0.09123 0.25827 0.22077       
'p
f_mal-1 -0.08132 0.16194 0.16005       
'p
r_mal-1 -0.11446 0.19184 0.18853       
'p
f_ner-1 +0.17437 0.21515 0.17973       
'p
r_ner-1 +0.06267 0.39051 0.36334       
'p
f_sen-1 +0.07600 0.19351 0.22169       
'p
r_sen-1 -0.82466 0.57442 0.53762  -0.52937 0.32328 0.31079 
'p
f_civ-1 -0.14956 0.26345 0.22458       
'p
r_civ-1 -0.29143 0.57943 0.51154       
'p
f_tog-1 +0.01550 0.13096 0.10861       
'p
r_tog-1 +0.23480 0.26583 0.21833       
'm-1 +0.05779 0.18057 0.19561       
'r-1 -1.24930 1.06010 1.2475       
ecm
fr
-1 -0.13122 0.07398  0.07045  -0.15910 0.05327  0.05053 
ecm
r_ben-1 -0.24658 0.11564  0.13658  -0.27722 0.09600  0.09222 
ecm
f_ben-1 -0.31367 0.08445  0.08439  -0.35905 0.06284  0.05720 
V +0.02856    +0.02755   
        
'p
r_ben unrestricted restricted 
Variable coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. 
'p
f_bfa-1 +0.14791 0.07781 0.07385 0.11002 0.05111 0.05279 
'p
r_bfa-1 -0.07086 0.13062 0.09373       
'p
f_ben-1 -0.00628 0.06854 0.06697       
'p
r_ben-1 +0.29751 0.12949 0.12766 0.24432 0.08745 0.07803 
'p
f_mal-1 -0.06200 0.08100 0.07149       
'p
r_mal-1 -0.00976 0.09582 0.07814       
'p
f_ner-1 0.06570 0.10742 0.09056       
'p
r_ner-1 -0.02297 0.19549 0.21337       
'p
f_sen-1 -0.02268 0.09667 0.08878       
'p
r_sen-1 +0.10487 0.28697 0.26151       
'p
f_civ-1 -0.11131 0.13158 0.08990       
'p
r_civ-1 +0.30242 0.28954 0.26028       
'p
f_tog-1 -0.09632 0.06551 0.06602  -0.10388 0.04272 0.03643 
'p
r_tog-1 +0.02849 0.13284 0.10178       
'm-1 +0.05749 0.09031 0.09635       
'r-1 -0.14589 0.53135 0.83599       
ecm
fr
-1 -0.03690 0.03711  0.03153  -0.06343 0.02792  0.02771 
ecm
r_ben-1 -0.28238 0.06222  0.06965  -0.29743 0.05433  0.05873 
ecm
f_ben-1 -0.08813 0.04424  0.04467  -0.09076 0.03352  0.03626 
V +0.01426    +0.01340   31
Table A1 (Continued)
'p
f_mal unrestricted restricted 
Variable coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. 
'p
f_bfa-1 +0.07121 0.10827 0.10612       
'p
r_bfa-1 -0.13323 0.18220 0.21470  -0.31374 0.13849 0.16119 
'p
f_ben-1 +0.12188 0.09190 0.08634  +0.14521 0.06568 0.06415 
'p
r_ben-1 -0.09334 0.17884 0.12057       
'p
f_mal-1 -0.08955 0.11571 0.12966       
'p
r_mal-1 -0.23395 0.15515 0.13071  -0.17605 0.10550 0.09336 
'p
f_ner-1 +0.15267 0.15005 0.14004       
'p
r_ner-1 -0.08867 0.27076 0.26683       
'p
f_sen-1 -0.04496 0.13494 0.12704       
'p
r_sen-1 +0.26296 0.40813 0.34162       
'p
f_civ-1 -0.24974 0.19077 0.17683       
'p
r_civ-1 +0.62398 0.40007 0.40245       
'p
f_tog-1 -0.00926 0.09028 0.07906       
'p
r_tog-1 -0.07954 0.18280 0.13216       
'm-1 -0.19424 0.12368 0.14694  -0.25420 0.10002 0.11380 
'r-1 -0.71551 0.72219 0.62875  -1.44860 0.53339 0.58475 
ecm
fr
-1 -0.08426 0.05538  0.05447  -0.09486 0.04273  0.04057 
ecm
r_mal-1 +0.05569 0.15194  0.13960       
ecm
f_mal-1 -0.20535 0.05390  0.05213  -0.18944 0.04212  0.04497 
V +0.01977    +0.01891   
        
'p
r_mal unrestricted restricted 
Variable coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. 
'p
f_bfa-1 -0.17433 0.08857 0.13829       
'p
r_bfa-1 +0.18561 0.14904 0.17139 0.19032 0.11280 0.08319 
'p
f_ben-1 +0.04839 0.07511 0.11039       
'p
r_ben-1 -0.06482 0.14609 0.13844       
'p
f_mal-1 +0.04949 0.09449 0.08756       
'p
r_mal-1 +0.05642 0.12627 0.10592       
'p
f_ner-1 +0.08301 0.12276 0.09430       
'p
r_ner-1 +0.17322 0.22107 0.20841       
'p
f_sen-1 +0.08660 0.11034 0.09207       
'p
r_sen-1 -0.22998 0.33335 0.28186       
'p
f_civ-1 +0.23757 0.15566 0.14424       
'p
r_civ-1 -0.32315 0.32735 0.26977       
'p
f_tog-1 -0.05306 0.07382 0.06061       
'p
r_tog-1 +0.02867 0.14958 0.19192       
'm-1 +0.00073 0.10119 0.11316       
'r-1 +0.17791 0.59053 0.46049       
ecm
fr
-1 +0.00671 0.04497  0.04742       
ecm
r_mal-1 -0.49746 0.12180  0.14523  -0.46227 0.090164 0.12244 
ecm
f_mal-1 +0.06135 0.04233  0.03680       
V +0.01618    +0.01589   32
Table A1 (Continued)
'p
f_ner unrestricted restricted 
Variable coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. 
'p
f_bfa-1 +0.10768 0.08901 0.09147       
'p
r_bfa-1 +0.25865 0.15072 0.12747       
'p
f_ben-1 -0.02091 0.07533 0.06286       
'p
r_ben-1 -0.02975 0.14430 0.14535       
'p
f_mal-1 +0.01358 0.09220 0.09688       
'p
r_mal-1 +0.01265 0.11035 0.07724       
'p
f_ner-1 +0.12545 0.12664 0.14302       
'p
r_ner-1 +0.05262 0.23013 0.27115       
'p
f_sen-1 -0.04389 0.11090 0.11223       
'p
r_sen-1 +0.27876 0.33163 0.32420       
'p
f_civ-1 -0.17785 0.15624 0.13294       
'p
r_civ-1 +0.01788 0.33118 0.29792       
'p
f_tog-1 +0.08365 0.07553 0.07613 0.08594 0.05252 0.03857 
'p
r_tog-1 +0.06161 0.15122 0.13761       
'm-1 +0.08466 0.10394 0.09397       
'r-1 +0.45541 0.59581 0.90069       
ecm
fr
-1 -0.04910 0.04236  0.04067  -0.06322 0.03605  0.04023 
ecm
r_ner-1 -0.14756 0.12781  0.11065       
ecm
f_ner-1 -0.15881 0.05079  0.05664  -0.13621 0.04387  0.05175 
V  +0.01635  +0.01610    
        
'p
r_ner unrestricted restricted 
Variable coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. 
'p
f_bfa-1 +0.10183 0.04839 0.04466  +0.09359 0.03676 0.03144 
'p
r_bfa-1 +0.04691 0.08187 0.10619       
'p
f_ben-1 -0.11252 0.04092 0.04761  -0.11177 0.03241 0.03103 
'p
r_ben-1 +0.15007 0.07842 0.09878  +0.15075 0.05566 0.06200 
'p
f_mal-1 -0.00956 0.05008 0.05861       
'p
r_mal-1 +0.09093 0.05994 0.05571  +0.08980 0.04905 0.03792 
'p
f_ner-1 +0.10796 0.06862 0.06789  +0.10455 0.04965 0.04616 
'p
r_ner-1 -0.01043 0.12443 0.12786       
'p
f_sen-1 +0.03649 0.06024 0.05663       
'p
r_sen-1 +0.49779 0.17997 0.17618  +0.52212 0.12735 0.14743 
'p
f_civ-1 -0.13580 0.08460 0.08838  -0.09959 0.06204 0.05941 
'p
r_civ-1 +0.09773 0.17998 0.19894       
'p
f_tog-1 -0.07927 0.04095 0.04598  -0.09674 0.03144 0.03406 
'p
r_tog-1 +0.00951 0.08219 0.09246       
'm-1 +0.10346 0.05637 0.05314 0.08551 0.04592 0.04282 
'r-1 -0.16907 0.32321 0.32984       
ecm
fr
-1 +0.01154 0.02290  0.02054       
ecm
r_ner-1 -0.19122 0.06593  0.05790  -0.17603 0.05683  0.04631 
ecm
f_ner-1 -0.00526 0.02588  0.02225       
V +0.00889    +0.00825   33
Table A1 (Continued)
'p
f_sen unrestricted restricted 
Variable coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. 
'p
f_bfa-1 -0.06762 0.099337 0.10484       
'p
r_bfa-1 +0.14462 0.16668 0.17114       
'p
f_ben-1 -0.02024 0.08388 0.07981       
'p
r_ben-1 +0.13953 0.16265 0.17475       
'p
f_mal-1 +0.20695 0.10351 0.11563       
'p
r_mal-1 -0.07267 0.12185 0.08664       
'p
f_ner-1 +0.03066 0.13727 0.16422  +0.19979 0.08414 0.08590 
'p
r_ner-1 +0.18459 0.24042 0.25966       
'p
f_sen-1 -0.00947 0.13118 0.12097       
'p
r_sen-1 -0.06533 0.36491 0.33176       
'p
f_civ-1 -0.17027 0.17005 0.14694  -0.18513 0.11541 0.09435 
'p
r_civ-1 -0.33154 0.37084 0.36999       
'p
f_tog-1 +0.09697 0.08365 0.08463       
'p
r_tog-1 -0.08592 0.16795 0.17526       
'm-1 +0.22401 0.11714 0.10804  +0.18322 0.09672 0.09414 
'r-1 -1.10200 0.65697 0.68066  -0.77947 0.50437 0.44990 
ecm
fr
-1 -0.16995 0.08053  0.08213  -0.18235 0.05997  0.06674 
ecm
r_sen-1 -0.13971 0.15294  0.18735       
ecm
f_sen-1 -0.23444 0.07664  0.07748  -0.22138 0.06114  0.06585 
V +0.01806    +0.01730   
        
'p
r_sen unrestricted restricted 
Variable coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. 
'p
f_bfa-1 -0.01684 0.03481 0.03367       
'p
r_bfa-1 +0.12279 0.05842 0.06832 0.11214 0.04310 0.04719 
'p
f_ben-1 +0.04316 0.02935 0.02399 0.04560 0.01872 0.01734 
'p
r_ben-1 +0.03300 0.05691 0.05434       
'p
f_mal-1 -0.02703 0.03623 0.03945  -0.04922 0.02804 0.02677 
'p
r_mal-1 -0.00000 0.04271 0.03574       
'p
f_ner-1 -0.02006 0.04808 0.05291       
'p
r_ner-1 +0.17206 0.08431 0.10298 0.14923 0.05313 0.05358 
'p
f_sen-1 +0.00712 0.04554 0.04033       
'p
r_sen-1 -0.10002 0.12779 0.13460       
'p
f_civ-1 -0.09967 0.05950 0.06421  -0.12653 0.04159 0.03914 
'p
r_civ-1 -0.16452 0.12987 0.12616       
'p
f_tog-1 +0.07463 0.02927 0.03589 0.04801 0.02021 0.02656 
'p
r_tog-1 +0.01652 0.05885 0.07361       
'm-1 +0.11083 0.04094 0.04076 0.10519 0.03176 0.03389 
'r-1 -0.81023 0.23004 0.24646  -0.71760 0.17426 0.16541 
ecm
fr
-1 -0.02389 0.02665  0.02415       
ecm
r_sen-1 -0.25499 0.05082  0.05107  -0.23499 0.03643  0.04041 
ecm
f_sen-1 -0.05369 0.02476  0.02545  -0.03702 0.01284  0.01366 
V +0.00633    +0.00602   34
Table A1 (Continued)
'p
f_civ unrestricted restricted 
Variable coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. 
'p
f_bfa-1 -0.04100 0.08582 0.10190       
'p
r_bfa-1 -0.13904 0.14439 0.14497       
'p
f_ben-1 +0.09017 0.07212 0.07306  +0.07319 0.04222 0.05313 
'p
r_ben-1 +0.13760 0.13886 0.13562       
'p
f_mal-1 +0.13206 0.08827 0.07396       
'p
r_mal-1 +0.04021 0.10568 0.10114       
'p
f_ner-1 +0.12739 0.11880 0.11750       
'p
r_ner-1 -0.02766 0.20969 0.22167       
'p
f_sen-1 -0.00751 0.10620 0.09976       
'p
r_sen-1 -0.18757 0.31523 0.26222       
'p
f_civ-1 +0.11093 0.14509 0.13520       
'p
r_civ-1 -0.19940 0.31830 0.41297       
'p
f_tog-1 -0.02038 0.07126 0.05803       
'p
r_tog-1 -0.02982 0.14552 0.14463       
'm-1 +0.08254 0.09815 0.09431  +0.15710 0.07266 0.07270 
'r-1 -0.50074 0.56443 0.47436       
ecm
fr
-1 -0.06995 0.03889  0.04628  -0.06376 0.02886  0.03291 
V +0.01577    +0.01528   
        
'p
r_civ unrestricted restricted 
Variable coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. 
'p
f_bfa-1 -0.01466 0.04125 0.04812       
'p
r_bfa-1 -0.02497 0.06941 0.09343       
'p
f_ben-1 -0.00140 0.03467 0.03733       
'p
r_ben-1 -0.00237 0.06675 0.06581       
'p
f_mal-1 +0.04269 0.04243 0.03887       
'p
r_mal-1 +0.10463 0.05080 0.05002  +0.06995 0.03396 0.03356 
'p
f_ner-1 -0.00394 0.05711 0.06075       
'p
r_ner-1 +0.14530 0.10079 0.10611  +0.11335 0.05655 0.04411 
'p
f_sen-1 +0.00134 0.05105 0.04456       
'p
r_sen-1 +0.20192 0.15152 0.10675  +0.20184 0.09025 0.07171 
'p
f_civ-1 -0.06282 0.06974 0.07518  -0.11386 0.04173 0.04730 
'p
r_civ-1 -0.09186 0.15300 0.25076       
'p
f_tog-1 -0.05939 0.03426 0.03299  -0.04104 0.02212 0.02202 
'p
r_tog-1 -0.08338 0.06995 0.07831       
'm-1 +0.09966 0.04718 0.04658  +0.09701 0.03606 0.03400 
'r-1 -0.02269 0.27131 0.26728       
ecm
fr
-1 -0.02744 0.01869  0.01978  -0.02212 0.01335  0.01131 
V +0.00758    +0.00713   35
Table A1 (Continued)
'p
f_tog unrestricted restricted 
Variable coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. 
'p
f_bfa-1 -0.15221 0.14916 0.13687       
'p
r_bfa-1 +0.42100 0.25434 0.20638 0.45925 0.18614 0.16717 
'p
f_ben-1 +0.21498 0.12530 0.10468       
'p
r_ben-1 -0.15839 0.24211 0.18816       
'p
f_mal-1 +0.20217 0.15387 0.17611       
'p
r_mal-1 -0.12691 0.18457 0.22668       
'p
f_ner-1 +0.17214 0.20539 0.16234       
'p
r_ner-1 +0.00348 0.37511 0.37397       
'p
f_sen-1 +0.12296 0.18348 0.20460       
'p
r_sen-1 -0.95478 0.55292 0.50269       
'p
f_civ-1 +0.02215 0.25290 0.22538       
'p
r_civ-1 -0.07263 0.55914 0.55032       
'p
f_tog-1 +0.31720 0.12681 0.08940 0.29171 0.08316 0.08691 
'p
r_tog-1 +0.77210 0.25672 0.24789 0.71959 0.18604 0.17273 
'm-1 -0.08843 0.18125 0.15618       
'r-1 -3.48280 0.99494 1.83820  -3.14620 0.69784 1.07380 
ecm
fr
-1 -0.08031 0.06840  0.06316       
ecm
r_tog-1 -0.14980 0.12794  0.15269       
ecm
f_tog-1 -0.12766 0.04853  0.04764  -0.11475 0.04084  0.04882 
V +0.02725    +0.02693   
        
'p
r_tog unrestricted restricted 
Variable coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. coeff.  s.e.  h.c.s.e. 
'p
f_bfa-1 +0.04382 0.06795 0.05918       
'p
r_bfa-1 +0.14707 0.11598 0.13991       
'p
f_ben-1 -0.10554 0.05707 0.06302       
'p
r_ben-1 +0.23976 0.11033 0.11493    0.20186 0.07508 0.08952 
'p
f_mal-1 -0.13313 0.07010 0.07753  -0.09392 0.05528 0.05731 
'p
r_mal-1 +0.06453 0.08410 0.08349       
'p
f_ner-1 +0.12639 0.09353 0.08032 0.16006 0.07076 0.07543 
'p
r_ner-1 +0.05173 0.17134 0.16376       
'p
f_sen-1 +0.09529 0.08354 0.07484 0.14226 0.05925 0.06813 
'p
r_sen-1 +0.22860 0.25200 0.23297       
'p
f_civ-1 -0.03160 0.11524 0.10751       
'p
r_civ-1 +0.09611 0.25487 0.23547       
'p
f_tog-1 +0.04096 0.05786 0.05203       
'p
r_tog-1 +0.09109 0.11711 0.10852       
'm-1 +0.13853 0.08303 0.07737       
'r-1 +0.26498 0.45388 0.76093       
ecm
fr
-1 -0.02424 0.03120  0.02949       
ecm
r_tog-1 -0.26445 0.06108  0.07161  -0.19044 0.04462  0.05609 
ecm
f_tog-1 +0.03256 0.02284  0.02199       
V +0.01241    +0.01186   36
Table A2: Summary Statistics for the Table A1 Model 
         Log-likelihood    SBC     HQC     AIC 
Unrestricted Model       6329    -106.13  -113.02  -118.58 
Restricted Model         6269    -113.32  -117.38  -120.38 
Test of parameter restrictions: F
2(182) = 119.86 
Tests of joint significance of long-run ecm terms (unrestricted model):- 
        pf equation       pr equation 
Burkina  Faso   F
2(3) = 23.36      F
2(3) = 22.72 
Benin      F
2(3) = 15.12      F
2(3) = 20.93 
Mali        F
2(3) = 15.12      F
2(3) = 17.95 
Niger      F
2(3) = 11.34      F
2(3) = 08.44 
Senegal     F
2(3) = 11.48      F
2(3) = 34.74 
Côte d’Ivoire      F
2(1) = 03.24      F
2(1) = 02.16 
Togo        F
2(3) = 08.95      F
2(3) = 22.03 
Joint significance across all equations: F
2(38) = 157.88 
LM tests for first order residual autocorrelation (F(42,56)):- 
             unrestricted model        restricted model 
       pf equation pr equation pf equation pr equation 
Burkina Faso    0.57788    0.38329      0.85153    0.33829 
Benin       0.31929    0.96914      0.59740    0.86053 
Mali        0.31661    0.36285      0.63464    0.62930 
Niger       0.32559    0.62101      0.48216    0.51252 
Senegal      0.45696    0.74553      0.44802    0.68297 
Côte d’Ivoire    0.21518    0.36119      0.46006    0.54314 
Togo        0.39812    0.27811      0.59139    0.35904 
Model Forecast Error Tests (* = significant at 5%) 
Last 06 observations: F(084,76) = 1.5017* 
Last 12 observations: F(168,70) = 1.5118* 
Last 18 observations: F(252,64) = 1.2917 
Last 24 observations: F(336,58) = 1.1672 
Last 30 observations: F(420,52) = 1.2156 
Last 36 observations: F(504,46) = 1.4311 
Last 42 observations: F(558,40) = 1.3155 